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JUSTICE AND UTILITY: WHO CARES? 
Vinru a Held 0 
In the penod from the l 960's 1to the present, the dominant moral theories taught m 
undergraduates and elaborated in graduate school programs have been dcornok gical. 
especially Kantian theories, and consequentialist, especially utilitarian theories. Both 
lands of moral theory are theories of right acrion. Both rely on universal norms and 
recommend simple, abstract principles assumed to be applicable to all cases in which 
decisions are to be made about what we morally ought to do. The moral epistemology 
of both Kantian and utilitarian theories is rationalise. To the Kantian we arc ro rdy on 
reason co understand the implications of the Categorical Imperative and we are to act in 
accordance with the rational will, not our feelings. To the utilitarian, we are to bring 
about the greatest happiness or utility or satisfaction cf preferences for all concerned, but 
in deciding what is required co do so, we are to employ rational calculation and rely on 
reason to make rational choices. 
Arguments have been pursued about which kind of theory is superior, or which has 
the least severe unacceptable implications. And argumencs wichin both Kantian and 
utilitarian theories have been explored. Within a Kantian approac h, for instance, 
arguments about universalizability and formalism, about the connections between 
reasons and motives, about the responsibilities of agents, and about ideal contracts have 
become ever more sophisticated - some would say scholastic. And wichin a utilitarian 
approach, arguments about interpersonal comparisons of utility, about rational choices 
and contracts in situations of uncertainty or conflict, about cooperation and free,riders, 
have also become ever more sophisticated - some would say removed from realiry. 
In the last decade or so a renewed interest in virtue theory has arisen. To some, virtue 
theory is an al re ma rive to deontological or consequencialist theories, and shou Id replace 
chem. If we cultivate good character in persons and achieve a sodety of virtuous persons, 
it is thought, we wiH not need additional theory: virtuous persons will do what is best or 
what is morally required. 
Also in the lase decade or so, feminist moral theory has developed. In many 
departments and classrooms, it has had little influence, and debates continue to be 
preoccupied with the problems of Kantian and utilitarian theories or with a renewed 
interest in metaethics. But among a substantial number of philosophers, not all of them 
women, feminist moral theory is now recognized as a distinct and interesting ahernative 
approach to moral issues. It is recognized as making an important contribution co 
normative ethics and to metaethics. There are, by now, a substantial number of books 
in the area of feminist moraliry, 1 and a few general texts now include a segment on 
feminist ethics among their theories and topics covered. 2 
In some ways, feminist moral theory resembles virtue theory, bur many feminists resist 
classifying it as a form of virtue theory. I will treat it as an independent approach, one 
which contains many diverse strands and builds on all three of the other kinds of theory 
though it should not be seen as a version of any of them. 
Some feminists have been wary of or even hostile co moral theory as such. thinking 
that cultivating moral sensitivity, through acquaintance with literature and through 
actual practice, may be a better moral guide than any theory. 3 But others point out that 
the critics' own discussions seem to constitute "doing theory/' and many retain a 
willingness co try to develop feminise moral theory. The questions then are: is feminist 
moral theory distinctive, or is it a version of another type of moral theory, such as Kan ti an 
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theory, or utilitarian theory, or vmue theory? What are as rna1or elements or norms, and 
how should it be understood? 
Feminist moral theory of all varieties LS uniced by cenam core com.mirmencs: 
domination of women by men should end; women are entitled co equal nghcs; che moral 
expenence of women 15 � unportanc � that of men. Of course the meanmgs and 
implications of all of these positions require much interpretation. 
Feminise inquiry exploring the moral experience of women has led co careful attention 
to the caring activities in which women so often engage. It has led to a recognit ion of how 
neglected by other moral theories this domain has been. As women care for children and 
ochers who need cMe, moral issues are ever present, yet chis kind of experience has noc 
entered into the chinking of moral theorises developing rhe dominant outlooks. T radi­
tionally, women's mothering activities have been assimilated to what is natural and 
irucinccual, rather than what has moral significance or involves moral choice. As 
recently as 1982, David Heyd, in a way that was entirely typical, dismissed a mother's 
sacrificing for her child as an ex.ample of the supererogatory because it belongs, as he put 
it, to "the sphere of natural relationships and instinctive feelings (which lie outside 
morality). "4 
Among the clearest positions feminist moral theorists cake is that such a dismissal of 
women's moral experience is unacceptable. In taking such experience seriously, feminist 
moral inquiry has developed wh.ac has come co be best described as an "ethic of care." 
Starting with Carol Gilligan's empirical studies of the ways girls and women seem to 
interpret moral problems, and with Nel Noddings' phenomenological inquiry into what 
caring involves and how we evaluate it, feminise moral inquiry has illuminated the 
importance of caring activities and relationships in human life, and has established the 
moral significance of care. s Caring well should be a moral goal, and basic caring relations 
are a moral necessity. The values involved in the practices of caring need to be 
understood and cultivated, and the failures of many practices to reflect these values need 
also co be understood. Caring as an actual practice should be continually evaluated and 
improved. To bring about such improvement, radical transformations may be needed in 
the social and political contexts in which caring takes place. 
Many cautions have been raised about an "ethic of care. "6 To the extent that women 
have been confined to the work of caretaking, an ethic that reflects chis may have the 
effect of perpetuating inequality. It may merely mistake a historical fact - chat women 
have done most of this labor - for a claim about women's inherent outlooks on moral 
issues. And co the extent chat caring is for particular others with whom we have actual 
relationships, some fear it may draw attention away from the oppressive social structures 
in which such caring occurs. 7 To elevate the activities of caring, which should be shared 
by men and not assigned automatically to women, into an ethic of care associated with 
women's experience, can thus be thought problematic. 
An Ethic of Care 
What is an ethic of care and can these objections be answered ? How an ethic of care 
should be formulated continues to be a subject of feminist inquiry. I think the objections 
can be answered. 
My own views on how an ethic of care should be developed see it as incorporating at 
least these central positions: 
3
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1 .  In rrying to understand what morality requires of us or what it would be morally 
best co do or to be, emotion - s rm path ·. empathy. sensitivity, fell ow, feeling - lS valued 
rather rhan rejected.8This does nor mean that raw emotion should be out guide; foehngs 
need to be reflected on, and good ones need to be culth·ated. But it does mean that moral 
theories that rely entirely on reason and rationalist: deductions or cakulations are ro be 
seen as deficient. When rationalise moral theories think of emotions, the · typically think 
of egoistic impulses thac challenge moral norms, or of aggressive anger against which 
morality should provide restraints. An ethic of care appreciates that there are what some 
call the moral emotions, as well as those that threarten morality. Since even the morally 
helpful emotions can oft.en go wrong - as in excessive sympathy that can lead to a 
desrruction of the self, or as in the kind of feeling for others that crosses over into 
domination of chose dependent on one - we need an ethic of care and not just caring. 
Bur in understanding what it calls for as well as in carrying it out, we should value rather 
than reject the emotions of caring, of sympathy, of feeling for others, of hope for their 
well,being. Hume is here thought a much better source of insight than Kant or 
Bentham.9 
2. An ethic of care respects rather than rejects the claims of particular others with 
whom we share particular relations. The universalitstic and abstract aspects of dominant 
moral theories are thus questioned rather than taken for granted as defming features of 
morality. 
When universalistic moral theories look at rela1tions such as those between a parent 
and child, they may see them as permitted by a morality that deals with interactions 
between all persons taken as equals. They then may have little to say about morally 
evaluating such relations as long as they violate no moral rules against harming or failing 
co respect anyone. Or such theories may contain universal rules specifying that parents 
should care for their children. But they do not allow for such actual relations ever co cake 
priority over universal moral requirements. In a conflict between what we ought to do 
for che sake of our child and what we ought to do out of respect for universal moral law 
or for the sake of everyone affected, dominant moral theories would see the latter as 
having priority. Anything else would be ruled out as "favoring one's own," as failing to 
have the required impartiality. 
An ethic of care is skeptical of such abstraction and reliance on universal rules.10 Jc  
values actual relations between actual persons and holds that such relations may at times 
have moral priority over abstract rules. Dominant theories interpret moral problems in 
terms of a conflict between egoistic individual interests on the one hand, and universal 
moral principles on the other. They recognize the poles of"individual" and "all persons," 
and lose sight of everything in between. 
An ethic of care focuses on the area between these poles. Those who genuinely care 
for others are not acting to further their own irulit1idual interests,, but they are not acting 
for the interests of everyone either. They seek co maintain or develop an actual human 
tie, chey ace for particular others, not all persons in general,  and for themselves,in· 
relations-wich-others.11 Their stance is neither egoistic nor altruistic: the we U,being of 
the relation includes the well,being of the particular others for whom they care and their 
own well-being. 
In trying to overcome the ties and attitudes associated with tribalism, or religious 
intolerance, dominant moral theories have assimilated the domains of family and 
friendship to the morally suspect status of the tribal, or they have relegated them to the 
4
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non .. moral reaJms of mstinctive behavior, or penmtted personal preference. An ech1C of 
care recognizes the moral unporcance and the need for moral guidance, lll the relanon, 
ships of family and friendship. 
3. An ethic of care works wich a concepuon of persons that understands us as 
inherently connected with others rather than as fundamentally Uld1v1dualisoc. The 
concept of person in dominant moral theones is the liberal notion of the rational, 
autonomous moral agent, or of the self,interested individual. As Brian Barry usefully 
cha racrerizes a major version of this conception, ic is "the vision of sociery as made up of 
independent, autonomous units who cooperate only when the terms of co,operarion are 
such as co make it further the ends of each of the parties. "12 And as Michael Sandel adds, 
the vision holds that "what separates us is in some important sense prior to what connects 
us-epistemologLCally prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals first and 
then we form relation.ships .. .  "13 Although the Kantian moral agent is seen as having co 
assert his rational will against his self,interest rather than as being able co further his own 
interest through contractual agreements, he is no less an individual first. 
An ethic of care, in contrast, sees persoru as interdependent. Every person starts out 
as a chiJd dependent on caretakers, and we remain interdependent in totally fundamen, 
cal ways throughout our lives. That we can think and act independencly depends on a 
network of social relations enabling us to do so. From the perspective of an echic of care, 
co corutruct morality as if we were Robinson Crusoes or (co use Hobbes' image) 
mushrooms sprung from nowhere, 14 or to assume merely for argument's sake that we are 
pure, self,sufficient individuals, is highly misleading, and distorts morality. Of course we 
can think of ourselves as abstract individuals; the questions are whether we ought to do 
so, and what are che implications and effects of doing so, and of supposing chat this 
conception of the person is the appropriate one for our moral theories. 
A morality built on the liberal concept of the individual reflects at the moraJ level what 
may at best be a suitable view for economic and political interactioru between strangers. 
It is of limited value and ofcen inappropriate for the moral questions that arise among 
friends or within families and various ocher associations. And when the morality 
appropriate for those with whom we have substantial human relationships is explored, 
it must include the components suggested by an ethic of care. And then co suppose chat 
moral theory in general can be adequate when it is only suitable for the contexts of 
political and economic life (if it is) while unsuitable for other contexts is clearly a mistake. 
4. An ethic of care reevaluates traditional notions about the public and the 
private. Feminist thought from many directions has been critical of traditional views, 
built into the dominant moral theories, that there is a private sphere beyond policies into 
which government should not intrude. Feminists have shown clearly how the gender 
hierarchy underlying control by men of social, economic, and political power and 
institutions has structured a supposedly private sphere co the disadvantage of women. 
For irutance, women's "private" economic dependence on men has left women vulner, 
able co dominaci:on and abuse. The "private" domain from which government should 
supposedly be excluded, and is often assumed to be already excluded, has been one in 
which male heads of household exercise power ov,er women and, all coo often, engage in 
violence against women and children without legal interference. The law has not 
hesitated to interfere with the personal decisions of women concerning reproduction, but 
it has been very reluctant to curb the use of coercive power by men in what has been 
thought of as a man's "private" domain. 5
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Dominant moral theories have been heavily biased toward seeing the "public" life of 
men (;lS significant for moraliry. and toward missing the moral significance of rhe ''pri\'ate ·• 
life of women in the family. Thus can the dominant moralities concern themsel"es with 
relations between individual strangers assumed to be equal, and fail to illuminate the 
moraJ issues in relations between persons interconnected by family ties or by friendship. 
Here, relations are standardly between unequals - parents and children. for instance -
who did not enter freely into the relation, since no child can choose his parents. Such 
relaaons are standardly non-contractual rather than contractual, as in friendship, where 
thinking of chem as conrraccual would undennine the trust on which friendship relies. 
And here relations are ofcen permanent but constantly changing: a child, for instance, 
will always have the genetic parents she has, but as she grows to adulthood, she may be 
the one with power and strength far greater than her formerly powerful and now feeble 
and failing parents. An ethic of care addresses moral issues in the domain of the unequal 
and the dependent, in actual emotion-laden relacionships, whereas the dominant moral 
theories speak only to abstract, rational individuals assumed co be self-sufficient and 
independent. And chose developing an ethic of care often suggest that it may be suitable 
also for "public" policies and decisions, nor only for "personal" contexts. 
Care versus Justice 
As chinking about care developed in the work of Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and 
various ocher feminist theorists., care and justice were often seen as alternative values. 
"Care" and "justice11 were taken to name different approaches co moral problems and 
characteristically different recommendations concerning them. Care, as l have sug­
gested, valued relationships between persons and empathetic uderstanding; justice 
valued rational actiion in accord with abstract principles. Gilligan saw these as alternative 
interpretations that could be applied to given moral problems, yielding different ways of 
construing what the moral problem was and how i1t should be handled. She saw both 
approaches as valid, but since interpretation from the perspective of care had been grossly 
neglected in the construction and study of dominant moral theories, it should now be 
seen as valid, and che deficiency corrected. Gilligan argues that if one sees a moral 
problem as an issue to be dealt with in terms of care, one cannot at the same time sec it 
as an issue to be dealt with in terms of justice, because the two perspectives organize the 
problem differently. A given person can recognize both interpretations, andl examine 
chem one at a time. Moralicy, she argues, should include the concerns of both care and 
justice. But with respect to a given problem, we are left with alternative interpretations 
and no suggestions for choosing between them. 
Other theorises, Nel Noddings for instance, thought care should replace justice as the 
central concept of moralicy. On chis view, care could provide the guidance needed for 
whatever moral problems we face, and justice should be displaced to the sidelines. An 
ethic of care would be sufficient. 
In these debates, the dominant ethic of justice was taken to include both Kantian and 
utilitarian approaches. To those whose focus is on the difference between Kantian and 
utilitarian approaches, this may seem unwarranted, and defenders of both Kantian and 
utilitarian moral theories have tried to assimilate care to their own favored frameworks. 
From the perspective of those developing an ethic of care, however, it is the 
similarities between Kantian and utilitarian theories that is of more interest than the 
differences: both rely on simple, universal rules; both are rationalist in their moral 6
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epistemologies, both assume a concept of person chat LS 1nd1v1duahsnc and mdependent; 
both are theones of right acuon aimed at recommending rational choice ; ooch can be 
interpreted as far more suitable for guiding the decisions of persons m "public'' hfe than 
in dealing with moral LSSues of family life or of fnendship. Finally, both are concerned wnh 
issues such as jusnce - rhrough rights and through public policy - though a Kantian 
foundation may be far stronger for rights, and a util1tanan one for many issues of public 
policy. 1� It is in these ways chat an echic of care contrasts wich both. 
Debates for some time concerning an ethic of care became formulated as care versus 
justice. We were asked co consider which was more suitable for the concerns of femmiscs 
and our allies. Those concerned especially wirh oppressive social structures and unjust 
economic and political msucucions were dubious about focusing on che family and 
personal relauonsh1ps. They continued co see demands for equality as pnrnary, though 
nouons of liberal equality were reconceptualized, and they saw such concerns as best 
handled through an ethic of justice. Some argued that justice requil"ed socialist 
institutions and economic democracy.16 Others argued for the extension of justice to 
women in the household as well as the workplace.17 And others argued that an ethic of 
justice is superior to an ethic of care to protect women against violence and abuse.18 
Others defended an ethic of care against charges chat ic is tied co women's tradicional 
roles and complicit in them. And they showed how care could be extended beyond the 
contexts of family and friendship to call for deep restructuring of society, of economic, 
political, and legal institutions, and of international relations. '9 A caring society would 
reorder its social roles and transform its practices. Care could be seen as a public and not 
only a private value, if one uses those unsatisfacrory concepts. As Monique Deveaux, 
introducing a symposium on care and justice, writes, " A care perspective relies centrally 
on a conception of human good and entails a deep commitment to a transformative 
politics." Not only have care thinkers asked "what difference contextual moral reasoning 
might make to politics, but more radically, they've asked what it would mean to 
fundamentally reorder our social and political priorities to reflect the central role of care 
in all of our lives. "20 
Instead of seeing law and government or the economy as the central and appropriate 
determinants of society, an ethic of care might see the up,bringing of children and the 
fostering of trust between members of the society as the most important concerns of all. 
Other arrangements might then be evaluated in terms of how well or ill they contribute 
to the flourishing of children and the health of social relationships. That would certainly 
demand a radical restructuring of society. Just imagine reversing the salaries of corporate 
executives and those of childcare workers: Corporate executives now earn 52 times as 
much as the ordinary faccory worker, 21 and childcare workers usually make even less than 
the ordinary factory worker. When one thinks about the restructurings that would be 
required by taking seriously an ethic of care, the idea that an ethic of care is a conservative 
ethic tied to women's traditional roles seems very implausible. 
Care and Virtue 
Is an ethic of care a kind of virtue ethics rather than a distinctive kind of moral theory? 
Some feminists find an Aristotelian approach to moral problems far more hospitable to 
their concerns than Kantian or utilitarian ones. Insofar as an ethic of caire wishes to 
cultivate in persons the characteristics of a caring person and the skills of activities of 
caring, might an ethic of care be assimilated to virtue theory? 
7
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There are some similarities between an ethic of care and virtue theory. Both examme 
practices and the moral valves chev emlxxh·. BoLh see more hope for moral improvement 
in reforming pracaces than in reasoning from abscracr rules. Both understand that the 
prclctices of mora�ity must be cultivated, nurtured, shaped. 
As so far developed, however, virtue theory has not paid attennon co the pracnces of 
caring in which women have been so heavily engaged. Ale hough this might be corrected. 
virrue theory has characcerisrically seen the vircues as incorpora ted in various traditions 
or cradicional communities. In contrast, the ethic of care is wary of existing traditions and 
craditional communities: virtually all are patriarchal.� It envisions caring not as prac� 
riced under male domination, but as it should be practiced in postpatriarchal society, of 
which we have no traditions or experience. 
Virtue theory has characteristically seen the virtues as anaching to individual 
persons. An ethic of care, in contrast, is more concerned with relations between persons. 
It is a relarion of caring that is seen as valuable, or faulty, not the dispositions of persons 
apart from this. Annette Baier has argued that trust should be seen as a central concept 
of morality, and has explored it in some detail.23 Trust is a good example of a value 
inhe·rent in an etbic of care, for good caring relations require it and are characterized by 
it. And trust is a relation between persons not a value achievable by persons in isolation. 
The value of trust cannot be divided into che values of the dispositions of the persons in 
the relation, or to the value of the relation w rhe individuals involved. 
For all these reasons, care should not be seen as just another componenc - hitherto 
neglected - in what critics call the "bag of virtues." An ethic of care is an alternative 
moral approach of its own. 
The Ethic of Care and Feminist Morality 
ls feminist morality the same as an ethic of care? In my view, the answer is no. But in 
my view feminist morality will certainly include an echic of care. Views that an ethic of 
justice alone, even revised in the light of feminist concerns, can be adequate. is, I chink, 
mistaken. Bur so is the view that an ethic of care alone is sufficient. And the view that 
virtue ethics alone can substitute for justice or can incorporate care adequarely is also, 
in my view, mistaken. 
Recent debates among feminist moral theorises have generally moved beyond the 
justice versus care formulations. The questions now being posed are often about how 
these core values should be thought to be related or combined: How should the 
framework chat struccures justice, equality, rights, and liberty, mesh with the network 
that deliniates care, relatedness, and trust? 2� 
Feminist morality is surely concerned with the equality of women and with women's 
rights. If we look at the work of feminist legal theorists, we can see both criticisms of the 
justice approach, and a determination not to lose what it can provide. Catherine 
MacKinnon has argued, for example, chat "in the liberal state, the rule oflaw - neurral, 
abstract, elevated, pervasive - ooth institutionalizes the power of men over women and 
institutionalizes power in its male form .... Male forms of power over women are affirma­
tively embodied as individual rights in law .... Abstract rights authorize the male experi­
ence of the world."25 And many Critical Legal Studies and feminist legal scholars have 
been critical of focusing even legal argumentation, much less moral argument generally, 
on rights. They see rights claims as promoting individualistic, self versus other conflicts, 
and have argued that conceptualizations of issues in terms of rights claims ..  limit legal 
8
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thmkmg and inhibic necessary social change."=� Carol Smart shows how one can see a 
"congruence" becween law and .. masculine culcure," and she examines the way law 
"disqualifies wom�n·s expenenc.e" and women's knowledge.=· she urges femmms nor w 
focus on law and rights in workmg to bring about the changes they seek. 
Feminist legal theorists have also shown, however, how nghts cannoc be replaced by 
what an ethic of care alone would provtde. When nghts are viewed in the context of 
social praccice rat.her than abscraccly, they can effecnvely express che aspiranons of a 
social movement and "arnculate new values and polincal vision." Patricia Williams, for 
instance, argues that "although rights may not be ends m chem.selves, rights rheronc has 
been and continues co be an effective form of discourse for blacks," whereas describing 
needs has not been politically effeccive.29 And Frances Olsen, well aware of the 
deficiencies in relying on law to reduce the subordination of women, nevertheless shows 
in detail how with respect to statutory rape, rights analysis can lead co reforms takmg 
place and people's lives being changed in ways that empower women.30 
The area of sexual harassment illustrates the potential of legal rights co bring about 
social change that decreases the subordination of women. Feminist jurisprudence cu med 
the harms thac women have long experienced in sexual harassmenc into a form of 
discrimination from which they could seek co be procecced by che law. Catherine 
Mackinnon notes that the victims of sexual harassment "have been given a forum, 
legicimacy co speak, auchoricy co make claims, and an avenue for possible relief ... The 
legal claim for sexual harassment made the events of sexual harassment illegitimate 
socially, as well as legally for che first time."Jt Women now have a name for the harm of 
having sexual pressure imposed on them and not being in an economic position co refuse 
it. This may well provide a strong argument for the potential oflaw to bring about social 
change for women. 
The imporcanc1e to women of reproductive rights has become ever more dear as such 
rights are threatened and constantly challenged. Reproductive freedom is seen by most 
feminists as a precondition for ocher freedoms and for equal icy for women. Patricia Smith 
argues that "it is inconceivable that any issue that comparably affected the basic 
individual freedom of any man would not be under his concrol in a free sociecy."JZ As 
women strive to overcome their subordination in other areas of society, women's rights 
co control their own sexuality and reproduction and to avoid being commodified are 
especially crucial. 33 
Among feminist moral as distinct from legal theorists, there has also been much 
appreciation of the discourse of justice and rights along with the development of an ethic 
of care. Not all theorists have combined an interest in both, but there has been continual 
mutually enlightening dialogue between those whose primary interests were in one or the 
other approaches. I interpret many critiques of justice and rights as critiques of the 
dominance of this approach. Thar righcs arguments serve well for some domains should 
not be taken to indicate that they serve well for the entire speccrum of moral or policical 
concerns, or that legal discourse should be the privileged or paradigmatic discourse of 
morality or social interpretation. The framework of justice and rights should be one 
among others rarher than dominant. 
Moralities of rights and justice can well be interpreted as generalizations to the whole 
of moralicy and social evaluation of ways of thinking developed in the contexts oflaw and 
public policy. Such expansions of legalistic approaches are and should be resisted by 
feminists. These ways of thinking are unsuitable for many contexts, and many of the 
contexts now chought best handled through justice and rights should be transformed so 
9
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chat a care approach would be more suitable and could be seen to be o. The sexual .1buse 
oi children might be one uch concexc. Bur ro argue chat JLISllCt' and nght� should n )t 
dommare our moral thinking does nor mean the · are dLc;pensable. And though the law 
does creac persons as concepcuall · self-conramed md1v1duals, � concernon an ech1c of 
care can recogni:e a an artificial and misleading abstraction, we can also assert chat for 
some legal and polmcal purposes, ir may be a useful absrracrion a.' long as H ts nor 
generalized and imagined ro be rhe appropnate concept of the per.on for the whole ot 
moraliry. 
Feminise Theorises are well aware, as well, chat women muse have suffic1enc 
autonomy and individual subjeccivicy to resist and refonnularie the tie� of craditi1..mal 
communities and families. The feminist self is not absorbed into us social relacionships. l-1 
feminist critiques of communitarianism make this clear. 
Feminist Morality and Reductionism 
My own view is that care and its related concerns should be seen as chc wider network 
within which justice and utility and the virtues should be fit. This does not mean that 
the latter can all be essentially reduced to aspects of care. The model of reductionism 
seems to be the wrong model. 
Care seems to me to be the most basic of moral values. Wl[hout care as an empirically 
describable practice, we cannot have life at all since human beings cannot survive 
without it. Without some level of caring concern for ocher human beings we cannoc have 
morality, and without some level of caring moral concern for all other human beings we 
cannot have a satisfactory moral theory. Within a nerwork of caring relations, however, 
we can demand justice, fairness, rights, and out of caring concern we can detcm1inc that 
it is sometimes best for the sake of justice to imagine persons as abstract individuals. But 
these ways of thinking, we need to remember, are suitable only for limited domains, such 
as those of criminal law, taxation policy, commercial transactions, assuring basic human 
rights and basic levels of equal treatment - including in the household. While assuring 
basic rights is an enormously important cask, it is not all that morality should concern 
itself with. Caring well for our children requires vastly more than simply treating them 
fairly and not violating their basic rights. And the discourse of justice and rights should 
not push care to the margins, as has happened, taking justice's political refleccion as the 
model of morality in general. 
We need new images for the relations between justice and care, rejecting the impulse 
coward reductionism. The idea that one kind of value can be reduced to another, or one 
kind of moral recommendation to another, may be a legacy of imagining that deductive 
or scientific approaches are most suitable for moral understanding. 
While we can acknowledge that our moral conceptions could be arranged along neat 
and clean lines if only the messy concerns of moraliry could be reduced to the Categorical 
Imperative or the Principle or Utility, actual experience wich most moral problems and 
especially with those in the contexts of care - understood narrowly rather chan as 
including all the rest - show that this is a mistaken goal. While a generally Kantian 
approach does seem suitable for various legal contexts, many other cone ex ts such as those 
offriendship and family are not best handled with such approaches. And while utilitarian 
ways of thinking may be those that can often best guide the policy choices of govern­
ments, they are not well suited to upholding rights and ensuring fairness, and they arc not 
suited for contexcs such as those of family relations and friends where it is the particulariry 
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o( persons noc cheir universal feacures chat maccers mosc. 
If moral conce·ms abouc nghc ace ion could be reduced co che culnvauon of the \'lrtues, 
it would simplify our efforts ac: moral educanon and at strucrunng soc1ery m 1usctf1able 
ways. But I think they clearly cannot. ls Although virtue theory is not m my view 
reducible co theories of right accion - merely equacing virtue with act mg m accordance 
with principles of right action - neither are justice or utility reducible co whatever 
attitudes or dispositions virtuous persons will have. We need objective standards for the 
care of children, the safery and heal ch of cicizens, and so forth. Virtuous disposicions fail 
to tell us what they are. let alone assure that we meet them. 
An ethic of care, I have argued, cannot be reduced to an aspect of either kind of ethic 
of justice, or to virtue ethics. But if I argue for care as the wider moral network within 
which other moral concerns are to be placed, is this not co argue for a reduction of justice, 
utilify, and vircue to an ethic of care? 
The ari.Swer is no. We need new analogies and metaphors and images to deal with 
these questions. Inscead of the mecaphor of reduction through logical relation or 
conceptual analysis, perhaps we should think of a painting or a tapestry or a glass 
sculpture. There is an overall design within which are salient and less salient compo� 
nents. The overall moral design of feminist moral theory, I beli,eve, will be one of caring 
relarions. But within thac overall design there will be a number of salienc componencs 
organized around the values of justice and of utility. And chere will be many interesting 
and detailed elements concerning the virtues. 
Such a morality might lack the appeal of what various reductionist prograrris aim at, 
but faiJ co achieve. It might, however, offer a design we could live with. To the objection 
that without clear and fairly simple principles, we will not be able to teach morality to 
children, we should remembe·r that children have never been taughc the Principle of 
Utility or the Categorical Imperative. Children have been and should be taught such 
aspects of the overall design of morality as that we should not harm others, we should 
treat them fairly, and above all we should care about their well, being. We should be the 
sorts of persons ochers can trust and we should value the caring relations that connect 
us with chose close to us and those far away with whom we share the global environment. 
But how can a theory be like a work of art? A scientific theory is pare of the practice 
of scientific inquiry, but a theory in philosophy of science is a theory about chis practice. 
It may hold that biological theories are in some sense reducible to chose in physics, or that 
they are not. 
The practice of morality, I chink, should contain many recommendations that could 
be thought of as moral theories for particular areas of life: economic activity, medical 
practice, bringing up children, and so on. But the philosophy of morality should consider 
whether there is or is not some one underlying theory co which the ochers can be reduced. 
It is at this level that the various theories embedded in various practices might more 
appropriately be thought to be features of an overall design for living good lives in caring 
relationships with others, rather than as abstract formulations logically reducible to 
simpler ones. Moral practice can certainly be thought of as an art. Perhaps it is possible 
to outline some general recommendations for the development of what we usually think 
of as arc: seek to create what is beautiful and "true'' independently of such pressures as 
those from commercial interests; strive for artistic integrity, and so on. But we do not 
imagine that the practice of painting can be reduced to that of needlework or to that of 
glassblowing. Perhaps morality in all its different forms is more like that than like the 
sciences. Who knows? 11
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